

Australia-India Relations typified by Succession of Subtle Contacts, Sustained Connections and Strong Ties

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Abstract

A nation-state in its inter-state relationships embraces the terms -- contacts, connections and ties. Despite shared linkages based on geographical location and historical legacy between Australia and India, their bilateral relationship is replete with the envisioned prospects and failure of expectations testifying to invidious preferences and rapprochement. This paper seeks to analyse the Australia-India relations which are best fit into three phases – (subtle) contacts, (sustained) connections and (solid) ties. These Indian Ocean littorals, which were oblivious of each other until and after the British colonization of Australia in 1788, had their **contacts** begun initially in the form of trade (1792) and remarkable contribution of itinerant Indians to the economic development of Australia in 19th century. Besides the envisioned potential prospects of Australia-India relations and well-expressed intentions for strengthening the future relations, so commendable was the benevolent assistance of Australia. Even so, Indians in Australia remained victims of the White Policy infirmities until 1973; and the Indian Ocean littorals endured drift and discord attitude all through the Cold War period, inasmuch as their arguments became deeper than differences on account of poverty of communications and exotic impressions. The post-Cold War imperatives of globalization propelled two colonial cousins to embark on strategies for reinforcing the bilateral relationship through a series of initiatives which manifested in sustained connections which reflected a convergence of strategic perspectives so much as to become natural partners. Bearing testimony to the solid **ties** between them are their participation in a raft of multilaterals and minilaterals, besides the substantial growth in the bilateral trade and investment as well as convergence in their strategic, diplomatic and military linkages.

Keywords: Shared linkages; Indian Ocean littorals; Potential prospects; Drift and discord attitude; Convergence of strategic perspectives; Raft of multilaterals and minilaterals.

A nation-state as an entity per se, embraces certain nuances akin to those in the realm of sociology, like contacts, connections and ties which have semantical significance in the familial relationships. While connoting the relations among the members in a family, familial relations invariably subscribe to the basic traits, viz., contacts, connections and ties.¹ These terms, though appear to be interchangeable and connected cases of a concept-in-use, are distinct in terms of the degree / level of relationship depending upon the age, time and biological relationship.

Australia and India, the case in point, have many similarities due in large part to geographical location (as Indian Ocean littoral states), shared geological history, colonial legacy and bio-

climatic conditions as well as complementarities. They were expected to sustain a good stead in their relationship. Be that as it may, the prospects of bilateral relations are not altogether anticipated on the grounds of their shared linkages based on geographical location and historical legacy.² But the India-Australia bilateral relationship, as historiography amply portrays, is replete with the envisioned prospects, failure of expectations testifying to invidious preferences and rapprochement. Obviously, they experienced estrangement intercepted by accidental and brief spells of cordiality. Until and after the termination of Cold War, Australia and India relations have depicted divergence as the clear pattern, while convergence has stood out as a bigger story. The reconciliation between these British Commonwealth Nations, though attributed to the imperatives of post-Cold War globalization, has portrayed the change in the mutual perceptions/attitudes. It is with this foundation that this paper attempts to analyse the Australia-India relations which are best fit into three phases – (subtle) contacts, (sustained) connections and (solid) ties.

I. The Lengthy Phase of Subtle Contacts

That the geography and history have also bestowed many commonalities and complementary features for their mutual advantage needs some elucidation. As the geological history unfolds, these two Indian Ocean littoral states had their physical contact sustained until 160 million years ago as a part of the same landmass, known as Gondwana super-continent, embracing Australia, India, Africa and Antarctica. These components thenceforth got separated from each other; and later, Australia and India drifted away to their present geomatical location.³ As a corollary, Australia and India have broad correspondence in their mineral wealth. Of much significance is a degree of semblance in the climatic pattern between these two countries which do experience tropical, subtropical and temperate climatic conditions, the pattern of which are found in the form of a mirror image, with reference to the equator. India and Australia, which had endured a discrete historical momentum, were oblivious of each other. In the absence of human contacts for over several thousands of years, the commonalties remain obscured until and after the colonization of these two territories by the British in 18th and 19th centuries. This facet of history made India and Australia emerge “with shared and fundamental commitment to freedom and democracy and with shared membership of Commonwealth,” besides commonalty in the jurisprudence, based on Anglo-American systems and the widespread English. As logical corollary, there are discernible advantages on a win-win situation basis for both these Indian Ocean littoral states. These prospects would have impressed the Australian renowned historian, Geoffrey Blainey and inspired him to point out that “Australia seemed to be a satellite of India as well as a colony of England.”⁴

1.1.Beginnings of Contacts between Australia and India

There was no economic system evolved by the any of more than 300 ethno-linguistic groups of the Aborigines who inhabited far and wide in the island-continent of Australia. Within a few years after British colonization of Australia (1788), the newly settled Britishers endured food shortages that forced the British Australia depend on the importation of rice from India in 1792.⁵ Besides the dependence of Australia’s farming on the itinerant Indians, the Indian indentured labourers were instrumental for the economic development during the formative phase of British settlement process in Australia in the 19th century.⁶

1.2. Prospects Envisioned and Roots of Reciprocity

Even as Indians were affected by discrimination, Alfred Deakin⁷ had reportedly observed in his *Irrigated India* that “the future relations of India and Australia possess immeasurable potencies,” which he ascribed to their geographical proximity.⁸ Mention may also be made of few other instances indicative of the well-expressed intentions for strengthening the future relations. On the eve of the inauguration of Australia’s diplomatic mission in New Delhi in 1944, Betram Stevens, the Premier of New South Wales, favoured close commercial links with India.⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru at the Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi in March – April 1947 regarded Australia’s White Policy (restrictions on immigration) as essentially “a matter for decision by the Australian society over its own population composition and therefore immigration into Australia.”¹⁰ The Australian External Affairs Ministers, like Dr H. V. Evatt (1941-49), Sperry Spender (1949-51) and R. G. Casey (1951-63) too envisioned fruitful Australia-India partnership. The relations between them were ‘close and sympathetic’ during the formative years of India’s independence, when Australia was under the Labour government of Joseph Benedict Chifley (1947-1949). The two countries exhibited a broad identity of concerns and interest over the issues of regional and international importance, besides accommodating the attitudes of each other.

1.3. Propitious Bilateral Contacts

Despite their disagreement basically stemmed from their divergent assessments of the international issues in the context of Cold War, the genuine respect and good will towards each other (Robert G. Menzies of Australia and Jawaharlal Nehru of India) sustained the basic friendly relations between these two countries. Nehru regarded the White Australia Policy as a matter of the latter's domestic policy; Menzies too appreciated India's non-aligned policy as one pregnant with merits, in the context of the dividing global situation. Of much importance to this discussion is the assurance of Australia’s “full sympathy and support” to India, as sought by Nehru in his letter addressed to Menzies on the eve of Chinese armed aggression on north Indian border in 1962.¹¹ Besides its military assistance worth £ A2.0 million (about Rs. 21.0 crores) which was later treated as a good-will gift,¹² Australia along with US, UK and India participated in the air defence training exercises on the Indian soil on 9-19 November 1963.¹³ Both the nations came out of the rut of ideological dogmatism-- India shed its traditional indifference towards regional security alliances and exuberant enthusiasm for its much-professed non-aligned policy, while Australia affirmed its preparedness to meet the Indian military requirements. It was of much significance that Australia consciously did not interfere in the Indo-Pak war of September 1965. The McMahon government of Liberal party (March 1971-December 1972) in January 1972 recognized Bangladesh, which was liberated through the Indo-Pak war of December 1971.¹⁴ The succeeding Whitlam government of Labour party (December 1972 - November 1975) endorsed the concept of Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP) in the midst of Liberal Party strongly favouring US bases in the Indian Ocean;¹⁵ and of much consequence was mild reaction of Whitlam government to the India’s May 1974 nuclear tests. The Fraser government (November 1975 - March 1983), though reversed the Whitlam’s Asia-oriented policy, took the credit for concluding the first ever bilateral trade agreement in August 1976.

The bilateral relationship during the Labour Government of Robert James Hawke (March 1983 - December 1991) had begun to get revitalized with India under the prime ministership of Rajiv Gandhi (November 1984 - November 1989). Australia, besides ruling out threat from India to Australia, justified the Indian naval projection in Bay of Bengal;¹⁶ and both countries declared as having committed to the stability and the well-being of the Indian Ocean region.¹⁷ There were series of agreements concluded that facilitated bilateral cooperation in the form of joint ventures.¹⁸ Besides scientific and technical collaborations, valued at several hundreds of millions of Australian dollars, “personal diplomacy at the prime ministerial level” led to the establishment of Australia-India Joint Business Council in late 1986 and the Joint Ministerial Commission in June 1989,¹⁹ as well as forging 21 collaborations within a short span of 2 years (1988-90).²⁰ India’s developmental needs identified the high priority areas that entitled to Australian expertise and assistance to a tune of several thousands of Australian dollars in late 1980s and early 1990s.²¹ Regardless of the political instability in India under the National Front government (1989-1991), Canberra sought to strengthen cooperation between the RAN and the Indian navy for protecting the sea lanes. In its report of July 1990, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (SSCFADT) also found no threat in India's military capabilities to Australia or Southeast Asia.²² Of much implication was Australia's recognition of India's security concerns and its imperative need for maintaining appropriate military capabilities. These littoral states forged defence cooperation which culminated in the joint naval exercises in Bay of Bengal waters in November 1991, after a gap of 28 years. Thanks to the act of naval diplomacy, Australia was no longer critical of India's naval expansion, and India too did not castigate Australia's alliance with the US meant for ensuring Australia's own security.

1.4. Bilateral Relationship Incongruous with Geography and History

The common denominators and the complementary features between Australia and India were of no consequence, because of lacklustre relationship. The peoples of both the countries developed exotic impressions of each, due in large part to ‘lack of knowledge of Australia’ in India and an ‘ignorance or neglect of India’ in Australia. The invasive perceptions, though altogether unjustifiable, were so deep-rooted in the minds of the people that echoed an element of contempt and acrimony. Lack of basic knowledge of each other country, according to I. K. Gujral, was nothing but ‘the poverty of communication links;’ and it was ‘the inability of India and Australia in forging the much expected ‘very close relationship,’ as lamented by Gough Whitlam.²³ Ample evidences are there pointing to the issue of apathy on the part of Australia colonial administration. Australia dreadfully had a very thin memory of the remarkable contribution of the Indian immigrants to the economic development of Australia in the 19th century. There were restrictions imposed on the Indian immigration into Australia all through 19th century. The newly formed Federated State of Australia (1901) had only reinforced the restrictions through its White Policy of 1901, which gave credence to the purity of the race. In the face of Indian migrants’ resentment, the Australian Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes’ Reciprocity Act (1918) removed the disabilities of White Policy and accorded civil status and right of franchise to the Indians. Though the Indians in theory had a citizenship status equal to any British subjects, there was, for practical purposes, a virtual ban on granting certificates.²⁴

Even after 1947, the sustained discrimination against Indians in Australia was so rigid that made Indians victims until and after abolition of the White Policy infirmities in 1973.²⁵

1.5. Dogmatic Drift outpaced Geographical Distance

The Cold War situation made these two Indian Ocean littoral states get drifted along their respective political ideologies. The diplomatic gap between the two Prime Ministers (Robert G. Menzies of Australia and Jawaharlal Nehru of India) had only pushed them onto the stage of getting hardened with irreconcilable attitudes towards issues of no bilateral concern and underpinning differential perceptions of international affairs. While India was wedded to the policy of Non-alignment, Australia was, on the other hand, preoccupied with the fact of the US-led pacts and alliances like SEATO, ANZUS and ANZAM and Australia's military involvement in the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Malaysia. To India, SEATO was nothing more than “the antithesis of Panch Shila;” Australia was firm about projecting SEATO as “a collective concept” and as an effective method of securing the safety of Australia and other countries.²⁶ Australia, being cognizant of India's pivotal position in Asian balance of power,²⁷ sought India to play a major role in the Southeast Asian affairs; India was not at all inclined towards the Australian-proposed regional defence arrangements, instead it concluded the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. If Australia strongly favoured the US bases in the Indian Ocean by subscribing to the ‘concept of balance’ as opposed to the ‘Indian Ocean Zone of Peace’ championed by India. Australia found no enthusiasm in the expansion of relations with India which too considered Australia, as an ally of the US, irrelevant to its interests. This substantial divergence and the sense of discard that emanated from it, had even nullified the good will generated by the Colombo Plan which India earlier described the Plan as “remarkable and significant.” But the Liberal Party government of Malcom Fraser largely subscribed to “the concept of balance” in the Indian Ocean, and its sworn opposition to IOZOP concept was evident even as the Report of SSCFADT (November 1976) endorsed the IOZOP doctrine.²⁸ Fraser who visited India thrice (January 1979, August 1980 and August 1981) sustained Australia's perception of Indian Ocean as being distinctly different from India's views; evidently Australia and India were rigidly committed to its own individual methodologies in ensuring security.

The chequered history marked by drift and discard attitude of Australia and India towards each other demonstrated the state of impercipient and nonchalance. That “Australia has mostly been the suitor and India the reluctant bride” bears testimony to their nonchalant attitude.²⁹ Their repulsive behaviour, simply the manifestation of irreconcilable attitudes, impinged on the tone and tenor of their bilateral relationship. All those envisioned prospects of bilateral relationship lost their credibility in the context of their estranged relationship. Obviously, their bilateral relationship witnessed an alternation of affability and dormancy all through 20th century, especially during the Cold war period.

II. Heralded the Beginning of Sustained Connections

2.1. A New Era of Political Bonhomie in the Bilateral Relationship.

The cessation of the Cold War political inhibitions heralded a new era of political bonhomie in the Indo-Australian bilateral relationship. The conscientious efforts, testifying to

the sustenance of mutual interests, obviously entailed the compulsions of global economic liberalization process. India and Australia began to rediscover each other not only politically and culturally, but also economically as equal partners in trade and investment by identifying the avenues of cooperation in commerce and trade, transfer of scientific and technical know-how, and investment. In fact, the 'commonalities and complementarities' had become the catchphrase for Canberra which outlined a series of initiatives. To mention a few were the Australia - India Council (1992), Australian DFAT report, India's Economy at the Midnight Hour (April 1994), the inauguration of a month-long India-Today 1994 Celebrations in Sydney and the Australia-India: New Horizons Campaign (1996), which had all testified to Australia's commitment to strengthening bilateral relationship with India. The BJP-Coalition government that succeeded the United Front government responded to the sustained efforts of the Howard government at strengthening the burgeoning the bilateral partnership. It was the reciprocity in their efforts that led to the phenomenal increase in the joint ventures from a minuscule number of 37 (1950-87) to 70 (1990), 159 (1995) and then to 356 (late 1990s); and more than fifty percent of them were technical in nature.³⁰ Australia-India New Horizon programme, launched by Alexander Downer the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade in New Delhi in October 1997, enhanced the cult of a positive defence relationship with thrust on maritime security. Alexander Downer's initiative for a "strategic dialogue" in March 2000 was based on Australia's recognition of India's importance in the of regional and global affairs. Thanks to the bipartisan support extended to the efforts of both the governments, there have been visible positive trends as in the case of bilateral trade and investment flows as well as the phenomenal increase in the joint ventures. Australia's people and our business sector have the vision and the capacity to take up the challenge of building stronger ties with India. Taking advantage of the entente in political relations, India sought to avail itself of the benefit of acquiring Australian scientific and technical expertise which was best adopted to the Indian environment and economic situation.

2.2. Australia's desire to Rediscover a Nuclearized India

Perplexedly enough, the Australian government's reaction to India's nuclear tests of May 1998, was more strident than that of any other country. Australia's vociferous reaction was much contrary to its eloquent appreciation of India's economic reforms and its earlier eagerness in deepening bilateral partnership with India. Having got reconciled to the reality that its vociferous reaction had only drawn a blank, Australia did not like to make the bilateral relationship a hostage to the nuclear issue. Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, whose visit to India coincided with the visit of the US President Bill Clinton in March 2000, endorsed India's nuclear deterrence capability on the grounds of perceived threat to its own security.³¹ Australia's desire to rediscover a nuclearized India was once again evident in Howard's "fence mending mission" to India in July 2000. For all his appreciation of the two countries having much in common bereft of earlier constraints, Howard ruled out the supply of uranium to India with no semblance to the Indo-US nuclear deal. India-Australia relations underwent a difficult history (1944-2000) on account of Cold War-era geopolitics, strained people-to-people ties, India's nuclear status, and shallow economic and trade links.

III. Towards Sustainable Cooperation and Partnership

3.1. Building a Broad Knowledge Partnership

Even as the differences on CTBT and NPT persisted, ADF's White Paper (December 2000) which favoured strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region led these two Indian Ocean littoral states to have Strategic Dialogue (August 2001). The Australian navy participated in the Indian International Fleet Review in February 2001, another joint naval exercise within a decade since November 1991. Howard's visit to India, close on the heels of US President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, testified to Australia's realization of India's importance and led to the conclusion of six agreements including an MOU on the framework of cooperation in defence and security related issues. The 9/11 incident led India and Australia to respond so sharply as to extend support to the American War against terrorism. Later, in the context of Bali incident of October 2002, India cooperated with Australia in the form of an agreement signed during the visit of India's External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, to Australia in August 2003.³² The Prime Ministers of the two countries (Dr. Manmohan Singh of India and Kevin Rudd of Australia) in New Delhi on 12 November 2009 acknowledged that there was a need for building a broad knowledge partnership in pursuit of taking the relationship to the level of a strategic partnership.³³ The much-sought after knowledge partnership was buttressed by diverse and expanding people-to-people links, given the valuable contribution of considerably large Indian community in Australia. Australia-India Strategic Research Fund was yet another commendable initiative of the two countries towards the end of creating a broad and strong knowledge partnership.³⁴

3.2. Settling on Maritime Cooperation and Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

The post-Cold War dynamics made India to shed its maritime blindness and desist the notion of 'non-aligned' Indian Ocean bereft of foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean. It is of much significance that the maritime consciousness of these two Indian Ocean littorals fostered maritime identity much more than ever before. The sense of sea-friendliness made them consider maritime security as an arena of convergence, inasmuch as the high-volume of sea-borne trade depends on the security of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). Australia's shifting focus from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific led to the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the form of Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership under the Australia-India Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation (2008). The concept of the 'Indo-Pacific' has thus become the most important factor driving India-Australia maritime security cooperation. Their elevation to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership entailed them to deepen navy-to-navy cooperation in promoting maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. Aside from their participation in bilateral and minilateral arrangements, Australia and India have associated with such multilateral initiatives as Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).³⁵ The multidimensional pursuit of MDA system for these two nations has become an essential enabler for maritime security and governance. Besides concluding the most prized agreements as Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) and MDA, India and Australia had accomplished their involvement in the Combined Maritime Forces. Of much significance is the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership focusing on maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as part of the Australia-India Comprehensive Strategic

Partnership of 4 June 2020. Australia and India, which used to engage in biennial AUSINDEX maritime exercise, have also been actively involved in Malabar joint naval exercises under the aegis of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). With shared objectives towards ensuring good order in the maritime domain, the two countries have participated in coordinated maritime operations. More important is the question of steadiness in the commitment of colonial cousins to sustaining the rationale behind their existence as maritime powers.

Conspectus

The pattern of alternation between convergences and divergences, though never manifested in any altercation between the two nations at any point of time, hampered much the steady growth of the bilateral relationship. If the history of the bilateral relationship narrates a regrettable tale of missed opportunities, there is need for these two Indian Ocean littoral states to get reconciled to the realities of the global order. Any laxity on the part of either or both shall reduce the otherwise propitious parallels to mere hollow and shallow hyperbolic expressions, reminding one, of the Greater India Concept that had only kindled the glory of the Indian culture.

Endnotes

- ¹ **Contact** refers to a communication, or reaching out and talking to someone, or coming into physical contact with something; **connect** refers to getting along well with someone, or developing a friendship, or establishing a strong relationship; and (familial) **ties** are the relationships between multiple members of a family through a moral or legal obligation to someone.
- ² Y. Yagama Reddy, "Australia-India Scientific and Technical Cooperation – Nostalgia versus Nonchalance," *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies*, Vol.15, No.3, December 2007; Also see Y. Yagama Reddy, "Understanding India-Australia Relations: Imperative Need for developing Area Studies," *Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) Journal*, No.4, 2010.
- ³ Hugh Finlay and others, *Australia*, Hawthorn, Victoria: Lonely Planet Publication, 1998.
- ⁴ Meg Gurry, "A Tale of Missed Opportunities: Australia's Relations with India since 1947," in Marika Vicziany, ed., *Australia-India Economic Relations: Past, Present and Future*, Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, the University of Western Australia, Nedlands: Western Australia, 1993, pp.11-12.
- ⁵ Asia Link and University of Melbourne 16 July 2008. http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0010/417916/High_Commissioners_Address_at_Asia_Link.pdf (Accessed 26 August 2009).
- ⁶ Besides largely engaged as labourers in pastoral and sugar industries, the Indian indentured labourers were instrumental for keeping the transport and communication lines open from the coastal cities to the interior parts in early 18th century, developing the telegraph lines (1870-72) and other construction projects like Central Australian Railway (1870-1929) and Transcontinental Railway from Augusta to Kolgoorlie (1912-1917). See *Australian Encyclopedia* 1958, vol. 3, p.156.

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- ⁷ Alfred Deakin, who served as the Prime Minister of Australia (1903-04, 1905-08, 1909-10), gained thorough exposure to different facets of India during his extensive travel in India which are reflected in his *Irrigated India* (1893).
- ⁸ Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia - India Relations: Trade and Security*, Canberra: Australia Govt. Publishing Service, 1990.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- ¹⁰ Gordon Greenwood, *Approaches to Asia: Australian Post-War Policies and Attitudes*, Sydney: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974, p.342.
- ¹¹ *Current Notes on International Affairs (CNIA)*, 33 (10), October 1962, p.41; 34 (1&2), January-February 1963, pp.48-50.
- ¹² *CNIA*, 34 (3), March 1963, p.22; *Asian Recorder*, 9 (17), 23-29 April 1963, p.5164.
- ¹³ *Asian Recorder (AR)*, 9 (50), 10-16 December 1963, pp. 19635558-59.
- ¹⁴ *AR*, 18 (10), 4-10 March 1972, pp.10645-46.
- ¹⁵ *IDSA NR*, April 1974, p.388 reporting *Patriot*, 13 March 1974.
- ¹⁶ *Australian News*, 3 (16), 19 April 1988, pp.3-5.
- ¹⁷ Johanna Sutherland, "Australian-Indian Relations: Current Status and Prospects," *Strategic Analysis*, May 1989, pp.191-204.
- ¹⁸ *News from Australia (NFA)*, 5 (17), 1990, p.1.
- ¹⁹ Meg Gurry, "Leadership and Bilateral Relations: Menzies and Nehru, Australia and India, 1949-1964," *Pacific Affairs*, 65 (4), 1992-93, pp. 510-527.
- ²⁰ *NFA*, 1990, 5 (19), p.1.
- ²¹ *NFA*, 1990, 5 (19), p.1 and *NFA*, 1992, 7(14), pp.1-2. For a full understanding of scientific and technical cooperation, see Y. Yagama Reddy, "Australia-India Scientific and Technical Cooperation – Nostalgia versus Nonchalance," *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, December 2007, pp. 336-348.
- ²² Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *op. cit.* pp.73-92.
- ²³ I. K. Gujral, the Indian Minister for Information & Broadcasting, made these comments at the meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan on 7 November 1972 (see *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10 (3), 15 November 1972, pp. 7-9); and the former Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, during his visit to India in June 1973, was critical of the mutual acrimony between these two Indian Ocean littorals, despite their shared common values and their belonging to the geographical region of the Indian Ocean. (See *Asian Recorder*, 19 (20), 16-22 July 1973, p.11392).
- ²⁴ A. C. Palfreman, *The Administration of the White Australia Policy*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967, pp.19-42.
- ²⁵ Y. Yagama Reddy, "Indian Immigrants and their Experiences in Australia: A Historical Overview," *Indian Journal of Australian Studies*, vol. 2, 2009, pp. 33-46.
- ²⁶ Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds., *Australia in World Affairs, 1956-1960*, Melbourne: Cheshire, 1963, p.342.
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- ²⁷ *AR*, 14 (30), 22-28 July 1968, pp.8434-37.
- ²⁸ *AR*, 23 (6), 29 January-4 February 1977, p.161.
- ²⁹ Sandy Gordon, *Widening Horizons: Australia's New Relationship with India*, Canberra: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Ltd., 31 May 2007.
- ³⁰ *NFA*, 5 (21), 14 December 1990; Marika Vicziany, "Australian Companies in India," in Marika Vicziany and Kenneth McPherson (eds.), *Australia and South Asia: A Blue Print for 2001* (1st edition), Melbourne: National Centre for South Asian Studies, 1994. pp.53-54; P. L. Sanjeeva Reddy, "Indo-Australian Trade Economic Cooperation-- Challenges and Opportunities," in S. Neelamegha, David Midgley and Chiranjib Sen (eds.), *Enterprise Management: New Horizons in Indo-Australian Collaboration*, New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 1999, pp. 157-76.
- ³¹ Jenelle Bonnor, *Australia-India Security Relations: Common Interest or Common Disinterest?* Working Paper, No.67, New South Wales: Australian Defence Studies Centre, April 2001, p.14.
- ³² *The Hindu*, 29 July 2003.
- ³³ "India, Australia take steps to initiate a knowledge partnership," 13 November 2009. <http://news.oneindia.in/2009/11/13/indiaaustralia-take-steps-to-initiate-a-knowledgepartners.html> (Accessed 04 December 2009)
- ³⁴ "Partners in knowledge," 13th April 2010. http://www.unsw.edu.au/news/pad/articles/2010/apr/India_visit.html (Accessed 14 June 2010).
- ³⁵ Australia and India, among various others, are the members in a raft of multilateral bodies, including the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Their participation in Minilaterals include: Australi-France-India; Australia-India-Japan and Australia-India-Indonesia.