

AI-Generated Misinformation and Political Trust in India: Challenges for Democratic Participation

Ashim Nath

Guest Faculty, Department of Political Science Ramthakur College,
Agartala, Tripura, India

Abstract

The proliferation of generative artificial intelligence (AI) has transformed the character of political communication in India, the world's largest electoral democracy. Deepfakes, synthetic voice clones and AI-generated text now circulate alongside conventional misinformation on social media and messaging platforms, complicating citizens' ability to distinguish authentic political content from fabricated material. This paper examines the relationship between AI-generated misinformation and political trust in India, and its consequences for democratic participation. Drawing on secondary sources, illustrative cases from the 2024 Lok Sabha election and recent state elections, and an analysis of the evolving legal and regulatory framework, the paper argues that AI-generated misinformation erodes political trust through two parallel mechanisms: the direct deception of voters, and the corrosive 'liar's dividend', whereby genuine content is dismissed as fabricated. It further argues that existing legal instruments, including the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, and advisories issued by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and the Election Commission of India, are reactive and insufficiently tailored to the specific risks posed by generative AI. The paper concludes with recommendations spanning media and AI literacy, platform accountability, electoral safeguards and calibrated regulation that protects both electoral integrity and freedom of expression.

Keywords: Artificial intelligence, deepfakes, misinformation, political trust, democratic participation, India, Election Commission, IT Rules.

Introduction

Over the course of the past ten years, there has been a significant shift from rule-based automation technology to an advanced form of artificial intelligence that can create realistic texts and realistic audio-video images. The emergence of generative adversarial networks, diffusion processes and large language models has tremendously decreased the cost, expertise and time needed to create realistic synthetic media. What used to be done under a specialist's supervision and required expensive equipment can now be done in mere minutes through free applications that cost only a few cents per product.

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This democratization of content-making tools has started good and bad effects. While AI-generated tools may be used positively, for instance, in political communication (e.g., translation of speeches into multiple languages, specific political messaging and communication with first-time voters), they may also serve for creation of fake events, statements and endorsements, consequently making the distinction between authentic and fake political messages less clear.

Overall, in different parts of the world deepfakes and synthetic media represent a serious threat to electoral fairness. To illustrate this, one of the latest reports published by the World Economic Forum entitled Global Risks Report 2024 proves that fake news and misinformation are the most pressing risks in the context of the world today.¹ Political figures have utilized generative artificial intelligence in their election campaigns by employing this technology to bring previously deceased leaders back to life in a new light, come up with false confessions and blunders by opponents, and generate endorsements from popular figures that never existed. This trend has created a situation when nobody can be sure whether the political information he/she is exposed to is genuine.

India is a particularly interesting country in terms of analyzing this process. It is known as the largest democracy in the world. With close to a billion voters, a distinct cultural and ethnic diversity, and one of the world's highest rates of internet and smartphone usage, it is important to understand AI in terms of the Indian context. The elections that took place in the country in the spring of 2024 were believed to be one of the most expensive with the amount spent reaching USD 16 billion, according to estimates.²

The usage of the mentioned technologies during the elections in India was not unique. Deepfakes and other AI-produced materials used in various political campaigns became more widely spread. For example, there were fake videos showing such Indian celebrities as Ranveer Singh and Aamir Khan endorsing parties they had not actually support, video materials created by representatives of other parties that were not real,³ and a virtual reincarnation of such historical leaders of the country as Jayalalithaa and Karunanidhi who acted as loyal supporters of those political forces after their death.

As it was mentioned before, Indian diversity makes the usage of the technology risky. The low levels of digital literacy in numerous regions of the country and the popularity of WhatsApp and other encrypted messaging platforms make such Moodle difficult to control on one hand and impossible to track down the information on the other. Despite the availability of a number of articles and books dealing with political misinformation and disinformation in general and the issue of deepfake technology in particular, the study of the implications of its usage not

¹ World Economic Forum, Global Risks Report 2024, cited in Pamposh Raina, "Year of Elections: Lessons from India's Fight Against AI-Generated Misinformation", World Economic Forum (Aug. 2024), <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/08/deepfakes-india-tackling-ai-generated-misinformation-elections/> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

² Anadi, "Deep Fakes, Deeper Impacts: AI's Role in the 2024 Indian General Election and Beyond", Global Network on Extremism and Technology (Sept. 11, 2024), <https://gnet-research.org/2024/09/11/deep-fakes-deeper-impacts-ais-role-in-the-2024-indian-general-election-and-beyond/> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

³ Resolver, "Alarming Wave of AI-Generated Content Floods Social Media Around Lok Sabha Election 2024" (2024), <https://www.resolver.com/blog/deepfakes-targets-lok-sabha-election-2024/> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

only in India in particular but also in different parts of the world is not extensive. Therefore, this paper aims at addressing the issues regarding the impact of AI-related misinformation on the people of India. The significance of the paper is determined by the fact that it makes a contribution into the area of political science and public policy at the very moment when Indian legal institutions that deal with the problem are being formed.

The paper pursues the following objectives:

(a) to conceptualise AI-generated misinformation and its relationship to political trust and democratic participation; (b) to map the forms and instances of AI-generated political misinformation observed in India, particularly around the 2024 general election and subsequent state elections; (c) to analyse the consequences of such misinformation for political trust, polarisation and democratic participation; (d) to critically evaluate the existing legal and regulatory response in India; and (e) to propose recommendations for strengthening democratic resilience against AI-generated misinformation.

Accordingly, the paper is guided by the following research questions: (i) How does AI-generated misinformation differ from conventional misinformation in its effects on political trust? (ii) What forms has AI-generated political misinformation taken in the Indian context? (iii) What are its consequences for political trust and democratic participation in India? (iv) How adequate is India's current legal and policy response, and what reforms are warranted?

AI-Generated Misinformation, Political Trust and Democracy: Conceptual Framework

Misinformation can be defined as incorrect or misleading information that has been shared with no intention of deceiving people at the time of passing this information. Disinformation, on the other hand, refers to spreading wrong information purposely. AI-generated misinformation has been defined as any misleading political information, text, image, audio or video, produced with the help of or changed using generative artificial intelligence systems, including deepfakes (a type of synthetic AV content where the person is seen or heard doing something they have never done) and voice clones.⁴ Three main features that make it different from earlier forms of political misinformation are: scale (AI technologies give the opportunity to produce content at a very low price), verisimilitude (the final products appear almost identical to original records from the point of view of an unsophisticated person) and personalization (the possibility to create content in an unprecedented manner for different languages, dialects and audiences).

Political trust is understood as the confidence of citizens in the fact that political institutions will perform as expected without having to control the process constantly. It is considered to be very important in political science and is often referred to as the lubricant of democracy: citizens have a certain amount of trust in democratic institutions that is enough to make them believe in electoral verdicts, obey laws and trust institutions without being forced to do it all the time. Political trust can be of a general nature and can also be specific, e.g. when citizens trust certain persons, parties or institutions like the electoral service, judicial system or mass

⁴ See generally David M. J. Lazer et al., "The Science of Fake News", 359 Science 1094 (2018); Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, "Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security", 107 California Law Review 1753 (2019).

media. Numerous studies have shown an association between misinformation exposure and trust decline in institutions.⁵ The spread of fake political information occurs much quicker than that of true information. The influence of lies, especially the ones that target either opponents or institutions, is such that not only do victims lose the trust in lies but also in the general information system. The process of misinformation becomes more serious thanks to the AI content. First, the fake news leads to direct deception. When citizens believe in fake stories, they evaluate politicians and parties incorrectly. Not to mention, the justification of trust becomes deeper due to misinformation. The occurrence of AI-generated misinformation makes people suspicious about their information sources, which could be real or fake. This phenomenon is known as the liar's dividend.⁶

The concept of the liar's dividend takes into account the possibility for fraudulent political actors to use the presence of deepfake technology to dismiss incriminating evidence as possible frauds. In India, there was a case when the BJP leaders stated that the video with the BJP candidate released to the public was a fake video created by AI, no matter how real it looked.

Democratic participation includes voting but not only that. Along with voting, people should communicate about politics, participate in community work, etc. The drops in political trust lead to two consequences. People either get mobilized and become more active in the short term or become passive and avoid politics altogether.

The study offers a comprehensive approach that includes three theories. First, according to setting agenda and framing theory, AI-generated content affects what people care about and how they process political events. Second, trust-in-institutions theory shows that AI-generated misinformation is not the only reason why citizens' expectations from democracy and the way authorities perform their duties do not match. Third, liar's dividend/epistemic security theory shows that generative AI is responsible for the falsity and doubts of evidence on which democratic accountability is based. All three theories are combined in the study to demonstrate the impact of AI-fake news directly and indirectly.

AI-Generated Political Misinformation in India

Indian politicians and their aides have used generative AI technology to their full potential. The occurrences before the 2024 general election are not limited to the election campaign period; in fact, the first such instance was recorded long before that, when in February 2020, Delhi BJP leader Manoj Tiwari used AI dubbing tools in a campaign video to deliver the exact same speech in multiple languages, the first case of use of deepfake technology in electoral campaigning in the world.⁷ The technology gained momentum, however, by the time of the 2024 general election, as reported by Al Jazeera, with managers of almost forty electoral

⁵ Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, "The Spread of True and False News Online", 359 Science 1146 (2018).

⁶ Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, "Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security", 107 California Law Review 1753, 1785-86 (2019).

⁷ Nilesh Christopher, "Deepfake Democracy: Behind the AI Trickery Shaping India's 2024 Election", Al Jazeera (Feb. 20, 2024), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/20/deepfake-democracy-behind-the-ai-trickery-shaping-indias-2024-elections> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

campaigns of both BJP and Congress admitting to using deepfakes to manipulate voters with videos costing only ten cents each.

The cases of the AI-processed videos were various. For example, one of the videos showed an opposition leader in police custody playing a guitar and singing, and this video was circulated by BJP-affiliated accounts. The Congress, in turn, published a video with renamed lyrics mocking the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi.⁸ Audio technology was also used in order to create statements attributed to politicians for party discussions or provocative statements. Images were changed, and they misrepresented the policies of various politicians, including the Citizenship Amendment Act. An AI specialist in the 2024 election cycle said he got a series of requests from political leaders to create false recordings of other politicians and overlay the faces of the candidates on bootleg images, which he claimed he rejected, but the existence of such requests shows that the use of artificial intelligence for creating fake content is already an established fact of electoral politics, although officially condemned.⁹

Platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, Facebook and YouTube were the main ways of disseminating synthetic content in political campaigns in 2024, while WhatsApp, because of its closed encrypted groups and penetration into rural parts of India, made it easy to send out fake news. BoomLive did an investigation that showed that around ₹20 million (239 thousand US dollars) was spent to buy ads containing hate speech or fake news by pro-BJP pages on one mainstream social media platform during the campaign.¹⁰

In March 2024, a coordination network for identification of false deepfakes was set up by the Misinformation Combat Alliance, in which the Indian citizens could submit items suspected of being falsified via WhatsApp.¹¹ At the same time, the Shakti Collective, a coalition consisting of over 300 journalists from over 50 Indian newspapers, made one of the biggest fact-checking campaigns in the world during the elections, using the support from Google News Initiative.

It is worth mentioning that the research carried out by Shakti Collective showed that 86 per cent of false content depends on visual information but only 2 per cent of it is deepfakes, which is much less than was expected given the fact that many regional languages and cultural specifics hinder the process of identification of deepfakes.¹²

During the elections of 2024, as well as in the later regional elections in Haryana, Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Delhi, artificial technologies continued to be used for producing false audio clips or manipulated images of the politicians belonging to particular castes or ethnic groups, though these incidents happened much less frequently than in earlier elections.

People in India have different levels of exposure and immunity to artificial messages. There are several factors promoting the situation, including lack of digital skills in some states,

⁸ Anadi, supra note 2.

⁹ Ananya Bhattacharya & Nilesh Christopher, discussed in "India's Experiments With AI in the 2024 Elections: The Good, the Bad, the In-Between", Tech Policy Press (2024), <https://www.techpolicy.press/indias-experiments-with-ai-in-the-2024-elections-the-good-the-bad-the-inbetween/> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

¹⁰ Nilesh Christopher, supra note 6.

¹¹ Pamposh Raina, supra note 1.

¹² Information Democracy, "Deepfakes during Elections" (2024), https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Decryptage_-_Analysis-Deepfakes-during-Elections.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

limited access to tools for the identification of deepfakes in Indian languages, high dependence on forwarded messages through WhatsApp and so on.

Impact on Political Trust and Democratic Participation

The increase of AI-created political videos creates a general decline in trust along two lines. The fact that the leaders are associated with false and fake actions and statements affects their respective reputations negatively, especially when corrections are not properly delivered to the audience, which is a well-known fact in the field of misinformation research. Additionally, stated awareness about deepfake technology diminishes the overall trust of people in all mediated political content, including information provided by the Election Commission, media broadcasting, and political parties, which expands distrust beyond the direct victims of misinformation.

When individuals cannot distinguish between real and fake media content, the process of making electoral decisions will be impaired in at least two ways. One possibility is that voters will revise their positions and views based on false and fake information, especially in cases when they match the existing partisan political preferences of those voters, which corresponds to the theory of motivated reasoning in political cognition. The alternative possibility is that voters would use their heuristic thinking to make political decisions based on identity and caste in cases when they are not sure about the background of information and do not analyze it in details.

In India, AI-generated content has been frequently used for the purpose of exacerbating tensions between communities and religions, particularly during the discussions of controversial legislative bills, such as the Citizenship Amendment Bill, and maintaining already existing tensions. Continuous exposure to content like this is linked to increasing levels of emotional polarization in society and political cynicism, the view that politicians cannot be trusted and always act in their own interests, which has been found in turn to correspond with lower levels of political engagement, such as fewer people voting and participating in public debates.¹³

The liar's dividend works in a way that is different from and potentially more damaging than actual deception since the mere existence and plausibility of deepfake technologies are enough for people to accept its truth. Indeed, politicians can reject any damaging news reports about them by stating that the info probably comes from artificial intelligence, thereby putting the burden of proven evidence on the reporters, and thus exploit the deficiencies of the media unable to conduct timely forensic checks. The situation in India provides an example of this practice when candidates using contested video material responded to such claim with assurances that the footage was generated by AI.

The implications for political participation can be categorized as being of two types rather than being homogeneous. In particular, in the case of deeply ideological citizens, misinformation created with the help of AI technology may lead to heightened mobilization, including increased level of online discussion, greater involvement into sharing operations and growing

¹³ Resolver, *supra* note 3.

intentions to vote, especially when the information is emotionally charged. Conversely, among politically indifferent citizens, the overall effect of untrustworthy information environment leads to withdrawal: their willingness to express political opinions declines as well as the belief in the usefulness of voting. Both types of behaviour clearly contradict the ideas about deliberation and participation outlined in democratic theory, although the ultimate behaviour of people in these situations is dissimilar.

The relationship can be relatively simply presented in the form of a cycle consisting of the following elements: the effect of political misinformation produced with the use of AI technology decreases people's trust in political information; lack of confidence in information results in distrust towards politicians and processes that the information concerns; untrustful attitude towards the political system leads to lack of confidence in people's efforts to participate in political life. Importantly, the liar's dividend contributes to every point of the described cycle as it doesn't require people to accept any specific lie in order to be able to destroy the concept of truth essential in any democracy.

Legal and Policy Responses in India

Currently, there is no dedicated law governing AI's content including, deepfakes in India. Rather the law applicable can be derived from general and existing laws. For instance, under the Information Technology Act, 2000, criminal offences like identity theft, impersonation and distribution of obscene material are punishable. The provisions of this Act are invoked in instances of non-consensual use of deepfake content. Under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860, offences of defamation and promoting enmity between classes are discussed, amongst others. However, none of these laws were made with the intention of regulating AI-created content specifically. The Representation of People Act, 1951 does not permit the disclosure of false statements or corrupt practices during elections. However, the provision of this law is limited to its application through elections petitions after a disturbance caused by illegal use of deepfake content for instance.

The Election Commission of India (ECI), in exercising its powers as per its constitutional authority as given in Article 324, issued a directive during the general elections in 2024 to political parties prohibiting them from using deepfake content or any other distorted content generated through the AI.¹⁴ Subsequently, some changes were made in the advisories and mandated that distorting AI-generated content in any form must be labeled as such for the sake of public awareness. Nonetheless, these advisories, which chiefly target registered political parties and candidates, are implemented utilizing the Model Code of Conduct, which is enforced mainly through moral persuasion, denial of campaigning rights, and referral for prosecution as per the existing laws, and not through an independent penalty regime exclusively for violations of laws regarding AI-based content. Its effectiveness when it comes to the issue of deepfake distribution by unidentified people or third parties also is somehow limited.

¹⁴ IndiaAI, "Election Commission of India Embraces AI Ethics in Campaigning: Advisory on Labelling AI Generated Content", <https://indiaai.gov.in/article/election-commission-of-india-embraces-ai-ethics-in-campaigning-advisory-on-labelling-ai-generated-content> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

Obligations imposed on platforms arise mainly through the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, where the adoption of 'due diligence' (including the immediate removal of any illegal content upon being notified of it) leads to the loss of the safe harbour status granted to them by Section 79 of the Information Technology Act. Having this in mind, MeitY came up with several advisories of which from December 26, 2023 relates to the deepfake issues as well as one from March 1, 2024 setting down the approval obtained from the government for the use of 'untested' or 'irregular' AI developments in India.¹⁵

Taking into account the feedback from the industry, on March 15, 2024, MeitY made necessary amendments to the In a recent move, MeitY has put forth certain draft modifications regarding the IT Rules that will set out the definition of AI-generated or 'synthetically generated information' as a part of the statutory text for the first time, assign different due-diligence liabilities to major social-media platforms for such information and make it mandatory to attach visible labels and provide traceable metadata and user declarations for AI-generated uploads.¹⁶

However, challenges abound when it comes to regulatory implementation, which makes things difficult. For one, the guidance-based mechanism followed until now does not have the obligatory nature and consequences of primary or secondary laws and therefore has minimal effect as a deterrent. For another, jurisdictional issues arise due to attribution problems as producers may be based in various foreign countries outside the regular platform-moderation model and operate anonymously via P2P messaging applications. Finally, generative AI technologies progress faster than the progress of the drafting of regulatory text or tools for detection of AI-generated content by platforms, particularly in view of the shortcomings of existing deepfake-detection technologies in terms of Indian languages. This is followed by issues with overlapping jurisdiction between MeitY, the ECI, and other relevant authorities.

Any regulation would have to comply with the constitutional principle of freedom of expression and with the criteria set out in Article 19(2). The existing interpretations and teachings of the Supreme Court, especially in cases like *Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*, call for narrow wording of restrictions to avoid the vagueness of rules that could be misused. A labelling and provenance-related mechanism is probably more compliant with the constitutional provisions in that it would allow for the existence of satire and parody that employ AI technologies while providing voters with sufficient information to analyze synthetic content.

Different jurisdictions present examples of workable solutions. For instance, the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act obliges people to disclose manipulation of audiovisual content by AI as part of the risk-based regulatory paradigm. Several US states, such as California and Texas targeted particularly at elections have enacted deepfake laws which prohibit the

¹⁵ JSA, "MeitY's Advisory on Deployment of AI Models" (2024), <https://www.jsalaw.com/newsletters-and-updates/meitys-advisory-on-deployment-of-ai-models/> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

¹⁶ Business Today, "New Advisory of MeitY: AI Platforms Don't Need Government Permission, Focus Is on Deepfakes" (Mar. 16, 2024), <https://www.businesstoday.in/tech-today/news/story/new-advisory-of-meity-ai-platforms-dont-need-government-permission-focus-on-deepfakes-421703-2024-03-16> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

distribution of synthetic media with major alterations of what candidate say and do. Similarly, South Korea took measures before its own elections. In addition, Singapore's Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act has developed a different approach allowing for correcting or removing the information deemed as harmful by the minister, which was criticized for being overbroad and for giving this power excessively executive discretion. The various drafts of the amendments to IT rules in India seem to combine some features of the labelling-and-provenance strategy of the European practice while keeping the features of the intermediary-liability model in Indian law.¹⁷

Findings, Discussion and Recommendations

Four important discoveries come forth from the discussion. Firstly, virtually created misinformation in relation to elections in India, although only a small portion of overall verified misinformation against traditionally falsified content, grows in sophistication, regularity, and partisanship. Secondly, while lies are widely recognized as effective promoters of misinformation, this phenomenon in India works more through general erosion of trust than direct persuasion through isolated lies. Thirdly, although India has become more active in employing regulatory methods, its existing approach is through non-binding advisories instead of dedicated legislation, which leads to large regulatory gaps concerning enforcement in particular cases of anonymous cross-border misinformation. Fourthly, the impact of misinformation on democratic participation is double-sided as it motivates political activism and discourages other citizens from political participation at the same time.

The newly established conclusions add to the existing research on misinformation and political mistrust by confirming that the same principle of the liar's dividend operating in India is a stand-alone and, in fact, more detrimental than direct deception. Second, they qualify the optimistic explanations alleging that both languages and cultures will give India a decisive advantage against sophisticated AI misinformation; while the current statistics on the detection of deepfakes show that such information accounts for only a small portion of the entire misleading information, the growth trends, production cost, and improving quality of the content in the regional languages suggest that this advantage is decreasing rather than lasting.

The sustained efforts aimed at promoting media, as well as AI literacy, will play an important role in this case, although this will not be enough by itself. This process necessitates the introduction of digital and AI literacy in the school educational programs, specifically in the disciplines of civics and IT; targeted literacy campaigns for older and rural voters that should be implemented via community-oriented and vernacular media and which rely on the trust of people to local information and to each other rather than on unfamiliar digital verification tools; as well as creating the easily accessible verification services in the regional languages.

It should be mandatory for the platforms, through various binding regulations, to introduce standardized labeling of AI-generated content, that will allow controlling the origins of such information; implement detection systems that function with the help of the Indian languages

¹⁷ For comparative regulatory summaries, see CMPR India, "Seeing Through the Fake: India's New Labelling Rules for AI-Generated Content" (2025), <https://cmprindia.org/indias-new-labelling-rules-for-ai-generated-content/> (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

and dialects; ensure the fast elimination of complaints during the specific pre-election periods, as well as publish bulletins with information on the extent of the circulation of such information. Given that closed messaging platforms play a crucial role in this process, it is necessary to introduce forwarding restrictions and labeling the content which seems to be suspicious from the AI point of view, which is done by WhatsApp in dealing with forwarded messages.

The new labeling and reporting obligations should be reinforced with corresponding legislation approved by the law on the performance of elections in such a way that the violations committed with the help of AI will not fall under the general provisions on defamation and public mischief. Furthermore, it is important to create an adequately funded unit for immediate verification of information and correction of the misinterpretations committed at preliminaries, because as the already presented case illustrates, even a short delay in the process of correcting the covered event may lead to negative electoral consequences.

In addition to the planned measures regarding elections, the protection of political trust in future requires (a) the creation of a specific legislation rather than the reliance on the advisory powers only that would regulate the issues such as defining the content produced by AI and penalties; (b) stressing the importance of watermarking for the creators of the artificial intelligence systems; (c) developing the appropriate technologies needed for verifying the information; and (d) ensuring that the regulators will regularly assess the regulatory requirements concerning the effectiveness of governmental action in the sphere in consultation with civil society organizations and academics.

Conclusion

This article argues that AI misinformation is a new and growing threat to political trust and democratic participation in India, either by directly deceiving voters or by creating liar's dividend that destroys any possibility of establishing a common ground of facts within the political discourse. The Indian experience, especially during the general elections of 2024, shows that such types of content have become an accepted means of political campaigning across the divide, although they have not made up the majority of misinformation about elections, at least for now.

The implications of this for a democracy as diverse and digitally penetrated as India are significant. Failure to address the decline of the common ground of facts would endanger not only specific elections but also the deliberative of capacity of election processes. The paper also warns about the risk of overregulation: the measures to fight AI misinformation should not infringe upon free speech and satire, in line with the free speech jurisprudence in India.

The research presented in this paper undoubtedly has several limitations. Its results are based mostly on secondary sources, journalistic investigations and regulations rather than original surveys and experiments. The analysis of regulatory practices provided in the paper depicts the situation as it stands now, in a rapidly-changing legal environment because of the pending amendments in the IT Rules. Finally, the discussion of causal relations between misinformation, trust and political engagement relies heavily on international theories, although their validity should be tested in India.

Further research is recommended in order to conduct a survey or experiment in order to determine how prone Indian voters are to AI political messages in terms of their trust in politics. It would also be useful to compare effectiveness of labelling measures in the context of India and abroad in the process of regulating AI misinformation. Finally, there is a need to monitor trends in voter trust and political engagement in order to evaluate in what way the emergence of AI misinformation is affecting political participation over a series of elections.

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